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AGING A N D  P U B L I C  P E N S I O N S  I N  AN 

O V E R L A P P I N G - G E N E R A T I O N S  M O D E L  

By LEX MEIJDAM and HARRIE A. A. VERBON 
Department of Economics and CentER,  Tilburg University, PO-Box 90153, 
5000 LE Tilburg, The  Netherlands 
In this paper a social-welfare maximizing public-pension policy is modeled within the 
framework of the well-known two-overlapping-generations general-equilibrium model 
with rational expectations. The model is used to analyze the effects of aging on the 
evolution of public pension schemes. Analytical results are derived for the long run 
as well as for the short run by the method of comparative statics and comparative 
dynamics respectively. This shows that the short-run consequences of aging depend 
crucially on the existing size of the PAYG-scheme. 
1. Introduction 
IN A path-breaking paper Cutler et al. (1990) asserted that in a command 
economy an optimal policy response to aging could be to decrease the national 
saving rate and increase consumption. Using numerical simulations they 
&wed that if aging is not too severe in the next two decades (as in the US) 
short-run consumption gains can be obtained while the current generations will 
be worse off if the aging of the population is beginning to be felt immediately 
(as in the case of Japan). They derive their results in a Ramsey-model of 
economic growth where a central planner maximizes a Benthamite social 
welfare function (SWF). 
The drawback of the Ramsey model is that agents are supposed to live 
infinitely long so that, as a result, intergenerational redistribution effects of 
aging and the consequences of these effects for savings cannot be taken into 
account.' Therefore, our paper considers this issue in the framework of an 
overlapping-generations (OLG) model. While sticking to the Benthamite 
SWF,' intergenerational transfers are explicitly modeled by a Pay-as-You-Go 
(PAYG) public pension scheme. Our  paper shares the objectives of Bovenberg 
et al. (1993) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). However, unlike our paper 
they are not able to give analytical solutions for transitions paths and have to 
rely on numerical solutions. 
The closed-economy general-equilibrium framework used in this paper 
' Note that, contrary to what is suggested by Cutler rt al., the two-step procedure used in Calvo 
and Obstfeld (1988) is not applicable in case of aging and a Benthamite SWF. 
As is well known, with a Benthamite SWF the steady-state capital-labor ratio does not depend 
on the size of the population, contrary to a more conventional, so-called Millian, SWF where utility 
is not weighted by population size. However, the choice of the SWF is not the issue here. Ethical 
(Blanchet and Kessler, 1991) or political (Meijdam and Verbon, 1996) arguments may be brought 
to the fore to justify the choice of the Benthamite SWF. In fact, we have chosen the Benthamite 
SWF to make our results comparable to those of Cutler et al. However, our method can be applied 
to a Millian SWF as well. 
( O x f o r d  University Press 1997 
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is presented in Section 2. In this section, a central planner is introduced that 
uses PAYG-transfers as an instrument to realize an optimal allocation of 
production and consumption to young and old individuals, respectively. In 
Section 3 we investigate how this optimal PAYG-pension system reacts to an 
aging of the population such as can be expected to occur in the next century 
in many countries. Aging implies, first, due to the increase of the dependency 
ratio, that total output per worker has to be shared with a larger number of 
pensioners, leading to lower PAYG-benefits (dependency-ratio effect). Secondly, 
aging implies that less saving is necessary to maintain the (unchanged) 
steady-state capital-labor ratio leading to higher consumption possibilities for 
both young and old individuals (capital-thickening effect). It is trivial to 
demonstrate that in the steady state the former effect dominates the latter effect. 
So, the long-run effect of aging is to decrease individual utility. Short-run effects 
are, however, less easily obtained. We derive analytical results for the short 
run for fairly general specifications for utility and production functions. It 
appears that the short-run effects can differ considerably from the long-run 
effects. More specific, we are able to qualify the above mentioned result 
suggested by Cutler et ui.,namely that an expected aging of the population will 
lead to short-run gains in consumption possibilities whereas an unexpected 
aging decreases consumption. It will be demonstrated that the occurrence of 
short-run gains depends not so much on the fact whether aging is expected or 
not but on the size of the existing PAYG-scheme. In particular, if  this size is 
relatively small, according to the Benthamite SWF, aging should initially lead 
to rising consumption possibilities for young as well as old individuals under 
both an expected and an unexpected decrease in population growth. This can 
be accomplished by the government in a decentralized economy through the 
extension (or an introduction) of the PAYG-scheme. This way, it smooths 
utility between generations living at the same time. In this closed-economy 
model, however, it does not perfectly smooth consumption over time as the 
intertemporal allocation of consumption is determined by a discrete-time 
version of the Euler equation that is well-known from the Ramsey model. In 
fact, the initial increase in consumption possibilities realized by the social 
planner goes at the cost of a decrease in utility for all future generations. The 
paper ends with some concluding remarks in Section 4. 
2. The model 
Each period a new generation consisting of a large number of identical 
individuals gifted with perfect foresight and living for two periods is born. So 
at each point in time there are two generations: the young and the old. Each 
individual takes aggregate savings, wage rates, interest rates, and tax rates as 
given. An individual born at time t works a fixed amount of time at wage w, 
during the first period of his life. A part of this wage is taxed away by the 
government by a lump-sum tax r ,  to be transferred to the old. The remainder 
is used for savings for old age (sf) and for consumption: cy = w, - r ,  - s,. 
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When old. the individual consumes the return on his savings and the transfer 
payment rl from the government. So the consumption at  time t + 1 of a n  old 
individual born at  time t is equal to c: = ( 1  + r ,+,)s ,  + r l , +  Individuals are 
assumed not to be altruistic: they d o  not care about the levels of utility of 
individuals born in another time period. It is assumed that lifetime utility of 
an individual born at time t can be represented by a separable utility function 
U, = I [ ( + )  + ( I / ( ]  + O))u(c:), where the felicity functions obey the Inada-con- 
ditions. The parameter Q indicates the rate of time preference. 
Production per worker at  time t is described by a standard neoclassical 
production function 
(If .:- < 0f ' ( k , ) ,(, f " ( k )- ,ik 2- > 0 f '" - ,,A2"'1 
where k ,  is the capital-labor ratio. Abstracting from depreciation and assuming 
that firms act competitively and that labor supply is exogenous, factor market 
equilibrium is described by the marginal productivity conditions f ' ( k , )-
k, f ' ( k , )= w,and 
Equilibrium on the goods market implies for this closed-economy model that 
investment equals savings or in per worker terms 
where 17, is the rate of population growth at time t which is assumed to be 
determined exogenously. The following resource constraint for the economy as 
a whole follows from the above definitions 
which simply says that total supply of goods can be allocated to investment or  
to consumption by the currently living generations. 
The government at time t is assumed to maximize a Benthamite social welfare 
function with a social discount rate p 
According to eq. (4), the government is a social planner who takes account of 
the welfare of all current and future generations where the welfare of a 
generation is measured by the utility of a representative individual of this 
generation weighted by the size of the generation. 
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Assuming that n, < p ,  the first-order conditions for a command optimum 
that maximizes this social welfare function can easily be derived 
where u1(c) r (duldc). Equation (5) is a condition for optimal allocation to 
young and old individuals alive at the same time and eq. (6) optimizes 
intertemporal allocation. This equation is a discrete-time equivalent of the Euler 
equation that is familiar from the Ramsey model with the social discount rate 
instead of the private discount rate. It is well known that this command 
optimum can be replicated in a market economy using intergenerational 
redistribution through a PAYG-scheme (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, 
Section 3.1). In particular, combining eqs ( I ) ,  ( 9 ,  and.(6) would lead to the 
first-order condition for individual saving. So, the central planner respects 
individuals' savings decisions. Abstracting from administrative costs, the budget 
restriction of a PAYG-scheme reads y, = ( 1  + n , ) ~ , .  
It follows directly from eqs (1) and (6) that the steady state of the model is 
characterized by3 
This is the well-known modified golden rule: the higher the social discount 
factor, the lower the capital stock per worker in the steady state will be, which 
is, of course accomplished by a higher transfer which has a negative effect on 
savings. Notice that, as stated in the Introduction, the steady-state capital-labor 
ratio is independent of population growth n and that the assumption p > n 
implies that the steady state of the economy is dynamically efficient. 
3. The effects of aging 
Given a government fixing tax rates in an optimal way as prescribed by eqs 
(5) and (6 ) ,it is of interest to consider the effects of aging reflected by a decrease 
in population growth ( n ) . In this section the short-run as well as the long-run 
consequences of once-and-for-all changes in ti are derived analytically. Most 
results can directly be generalized to  temporary changes in this parameter. 
Medium-term effects can be analyzed analytically as well, but we restrict 
ourselves here to an illustrative numerical example. The long-run effects follow 
from comparing steady states, while the short-run consequences are traced by 
When no time subscript is used the steady-state value is,meant. 
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comparative dynamics4 Regarding the short run, only the initial effects, i.e. the 
effects at t = 0, are considered. The effects of unexpected and expected shocks 
are distinguished. This distinction can be motivated by the fact that the timing 
of the aging processes differs dramatically in the developed world. In the US 
e.g., aging will be felt in its consequences not before 2010, while Japan is 
currently being confronted with the consequences of aging. So, the analysis of 
an expected shock is applicable to the US, while for Japan unexpected shocks 
are relevant. 
3.1. Slzort-run effects 
The comparative dynamics analysis is based on linearization of the model 
presented above around the steady state. The analysis concentrates on the 
effects of once-and-for-all decreases in population growth (n) .  Let n, = n + yh,, 
where h, describes the time pattern of the perturbation of the steady-state value 
of the parameter n and y the magnitude. It is assumed that at some time t = 0 
a shock unexpectedly occurs (i.e. h, = h, = . . . = h < 0) or is expected to occur 
a t t i m e z > O ( i . e . h , = h , =  . . .  = h L - l = O , h _ = h z + l = . . .  = h < 0). It will 
be convenient in the sequel to introduce total consumption per worker which 
is defined as 
As described in the Appendix, the linearized model can be condensed to a 
system describing the changes in this variable and in the capital-labor ratio k, 
where A4 is a matrix describing the effects of the current and next-period change 
in r l  on the state variables and J is the Jacobian matrix defined in the Appendix. 
As the system in eq. (9) is saddlepoint stable, it can be solved to find the 
short-run effect of changes in n on total consumption per worker, i.e. (ac,/ay) 
(see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) which is given by: 
4This  method is described by Judd (1982) for a continuous-time model. It can easily be 
generalized to  discrete time, however. See Meijdam and Verhoeven (1994), who  also show that the 
approximation of the short-run effects of a parameter change by this met:,ad is as reliable as  a 
standard comparative-statics analysis. The method is explained in the Appendix. 
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where 6(>0)  is a constant defined in the Appendix and i.,(>1 + d) is the 
unstable root of the linearized system. 
Notice from eq. (10) that the optimal response of total consumption per 
worker is in part determined by future changes in the rate of population growth. 
This is a reflection of the forward-looking behavior of the central planner who 
takes account of the utility of all future generations. So eq. (10) is 'the result of 
the fact that the government, when observing a permanent shock, redistributes 
income among all current and future generations by varying the PAYG tax 
rate in accordance with its objective function (4). Note that eq. (10) might be 
dubbed a short-run macroeconomic effect as it gives the additional (positive 
or negative) consumption (expressed per worker) available for the whole 
economy at t = 0. This additional consumption has to be allocated to the 
currently living young and old individuals. 
The short-run macroeconomic effect on consumption per worker appears to 
consist of several elements. Firstly, the initial effect on total consumption per 
worker is in part determined by anticipation of the future effects of the change 
in n as reflected by the appearance of the terms hj( j  > 0) in eq. (10). Two 
anticipation effects can be discerned. The first is the capital-thickening effect 
(see the term i.,k in eq. This effect stems from the fact that a decrease in 
n implies that ceteris parihus a lower level of saving per worker is necessary in 
order to realize a certain level of the capital-labor ratio next period. So, the 
capital-thickening effect implies an immediate decrease of the saving rate, 
leading to an increase of the consumption per worker. The second anticipa- 
tion effect comes from the fact that an increase in the so-called dependency 
ratio, defined as the number of pensioners per worker, implies that total 
consumption per worker has to be shared with a larger number of pensioners. 
This dependency-ratio effect (crj(l + t ~ ) ~ )decreases total consumption per 
worker. 
In case of an unexpected decrease in 11, there are not only anticipation effects, 
but also immediate effects on total consumption per worker at t = 0. The 
dependency ratio, for example, increases immediately. However, if the change 
in population growth is once-and-for-all, so that h j  = 11 V j  J j  0, then the initial 
dependency-ratio effect exactly compensates the future effect. Moreover, an 
unexpected decrease in H causes an upward jump in the capital-labor ratio, 
which implies a higher production and thus a higher consumption per worker. 
This is reflected by the term containing (c7k0,'c)y) = -(k/(l + t?))h, > 0 in eq. 
(10). It immediately follows that the short-run macroeconomic effect on total 
consumption per worker in the case of an unexpected once-and-for-all shock 
is positive. 
In case of an expected decrease in r l ,  the anticipation effects are the only 
short-run effects on total consumption per worker. Whether total consumption 
per worker will increase then depends on the difference between the dependency- 
This is exactly the opposite of the capital dilution effect that occurs in case of a n  increase in 
1 1 .  See e.g., Blanchet a n d  Kessler (1991. p.140). 
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ratio effect and the capital-thickening effect, a s  can be seen from the first line 
of eq. (10). 
Total consumption per worker has to be shared by young and old individuals, 
respectively, according to eq. (8). Differentiating eq. (8) and using the first-order 
conditions ( 5 )  and (6) we get 
where E is defined in the Appendix. It should be noted that in the case of an  
expected shock h, = 0 and the change in individual consumption levels cY, and 
c'l, is proportional to the change in total consumption per worker, i.e. (&,lay). 
O n  the other hand, if the shock is unexpected h,  < 0 and the positive macro- 
economic effect (dc,/ag) > 0 can be dominated by the dependency-ratio effect 
dependent upon the level of consumption by the old in the steady state. 
So, for both types of shocks individual consumption may fall or  rise in the 
short-run. This seems in line with the results of Cutler et al. (1990) who conclude 
that decreases in the rate of population growth have theoretically ambiguous 
initial effects on individual consumption. However, our analysis qualifies this 
ambiguity as it turns out that whether consumption rises or  falls depends to a 
large extent on the size of the PAYG-scheme measured by the tax rate. In 
particular, using eqs (IO), (1 I), and (12), the following proposition can easily 
be derived: 
Proposition I .  An unexpected once-and-for-all decrease in n initially decreases 
individual consumption for young and old individuals iff  z > (1 - 2,)s. An 
expected once-and-for-all decrease in n initially decreases individual consump- 
tion for young and old individuals iff z > (1 - 2 ,  + 6 ) ~ . ~  
The interpretation of this proposition is straightforward: If, in the initial steady 
state, the intergenerational transfers (as measured by the tax rate z) are high 
compared with individual saving, then the increase in the consumption 
possibilities per worker due to the decrease in savings of the young is not 
sufficient to provide the relatively larger number of elderly per worker with the 
same level of consumption as before the shock. The intuition is that if the tax 
rate is relatively large, old-age consumption is relatively large. Consequently, 
large increases in total consumption per worker are necessary in order to be 
able to maintain the consumption level of the increased number of elderly 
without harming the young. However, a high tax rate goes along with low 
savings, implying a low capital-labor ratio and therefore relatively low con- 
sumption gains per worker due to the capital-thickening effect. Hence, the 
h -
I., i1 i \  the stable root of the linearized system 
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government will choose to decrease individual consumption for both generations. 
This is achieved by adjusting the tax rate.' 
Comparing an expected with an unexpected shock, it is of interest to observe 
that no qualitative difference exists regarding the initial effects. There is, 
however, a difference of a quantitative nature as can be seen from the 
appearance of the parameter 6 in Proposition 1. This (positive) parameter can 
be interpreted as a measure for the speed at which changes in consumption and 
investment are transmitted to future periods and vice versa. In particular, if 6 
has a low value, anticipated future shocks will strongly affect current values 
and expected and unexpected shocks will have similar results. 
The effect of a change in n on the tax rate in period t is given by 
The first term in this equation indicates the effect of a change in the 
capital-labor ratio. At a given interest rate, an increase in the capital stock per 
worker implies an increase of the old-age consumption per worker (cr/(l + n ) )  
of (1 + r)(dk,/dy), thus decreasing the need for redistribution from the young 
to the elderly through z.An increase in the capital-labor ratio also decreases 
the interest rate and raises the wage rate, thus increasing the need for 
redistribution. This effect is measured by v, which is the (positively defined) 
elasticity of the production function v = ( - fU(k)k/f'(k)). The larger this 
elasticity, the larger the effect of a change in the capital-labor ratio on the 
interest rate. The second term in equation (13) represents the effect that, as a 
part E of total consumption per worker goes to the old, more total consumption 
per worker ceteris paribus increases the tax rate. In the third term the 
dependency-ratio effect can be recognized again. An increase in the dependency 
ratio ceteris paribus increases the tax rate. So, whether it will be necessary to 
increase or decrease the tax rate in case of an unexpected change in the rate 
of population growth, depends on the strength of the general-equilibrium effects 
caused by the initial increase of the capital-labor ratio that takes place in that 
case. If the decrease in n is expected, the capital-labor ratio and the dependency 
ratio do not change initially. Then the following corollary follows from eq. (1 3) 
and Proposition 1: 
Corollary I An expected once-and-for-all decrease in n initially increases the 
tax rate iff z 6 ( 1  - I., + 6)s. 
Obviously, as consumption of the old at t = 0 can only increase if the tax rate 
is raised, this corollary is just a rephrasing of Proposition 1. It has, however, 
'Whether the tax rate is indeed large enough for a decrease in population growth to decrease 
individual consumption in the short run turns out to be an empirical question. For Cobb-Douglas 
production and utility functions and reasonable parameter values (n = 0.35 (when a period is taken 
to be 30 years, this corresponds to a population growth of 1% per year), p = 3.3 (5%, per year), 
0 = 1.8 (3.5% per year), capital share = 0.33), the tax rate (8% of G N P )  is slightly above the critical 
level for an unexpected shock (7.5% of CiNP). Decreases in p and increases in 0, n, and the share 
of capital decrease the tax rate relative to its critical level. 
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an interesting implication. It implies that in the absence of a PAYG-financed 
public pension system (i.e., z= 0 )  such a system can come about in anticipation 
of a decrease in the rate of population growth. This result is rather surprising 
as intuition might suggest that an increasing population would give more room 
for the installation of a public pension system due to the low tax rates implied 
by high rates of population growth. The point is that an affluent capital stock 
at the time of the shock is anticipated by the forward-looking government. This 
incites it to increase the tax rate, simultaneously leading to a decrease of the 
savings by all generations living before the shock. These desinvestments lead 
to an increase in the consumption possibilities for old and young individuals. 
Some remarks on this result will be made in the concluding section. 
Another implication of the corollary is that in countries where the aging of 
the population will not occur before the next century but where the PAYG- 
system is relatively extensive i t  may be necessary nevertheless to immediately 
cut in intergenerational transfers. 
3.2. The long-run effects of a decrease in n  
In the long run, the capital stock per worker remains unchanged as immediately 
can be seen from the modified golden rule (eq. (7)). Moreover, the redistribution 
effects of a change in the dependency ratio cancel out and do not affect total 
consumption. So the only effect on total consumption per worker in the long 
run is the positive capital-thickening effect. Consequently, total consumption 
per worker will be higher, as can be seen from 
As in Cutler et al., the long-run effect of aging on individual consumption is the 
sum of a positive capital-thickening effect and a negative dependency-ratio 
effect. In contrast to that paper, here the net effect can easily be determined as 
there is an explicit relation between these two effects. Using eqs (14) and (1 1)  
or (12) ,  it immediately follows that the capital-thickening effect on individual 
consumption outweighs the dependency-ratio effect iff the part of total con-
sumption per worker consumed by pensioners ( c r / ( l  + n ) )  is smaller than 
savings per worker, which is equivalent to z< ( n  - r )k .  The fact that the 
economy is dynamically efficient then immediately leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2 If the tax rate is non-negative, a decrease in n decreases individual 
consumption in the long run. 
As in the long run the capital-labor ratio does not change, it can easily be 
derived that the long-run tax rate is a negative function of the rate of population 
growth. Consequently, the effect of a decrease in population growth on the 
long-run transfer payment g is positive if z< 0 .  If the tax rate is positive, 
however, the effect on the transfer payment is ambiguous. 
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3.3. ~blediurn-termeffects 
The evolution of c and k after the initial change at t = 0 can be traced by using 
system (9). The changes in all other variables can be derived from the changes 
of these state variables. The analytical derivations d o  not produce any 
additional insight, however. Instead, we produce a numerical example in order 
to illustrate the mechanics of the model. Suppose that the economy is in the 
steady state when at time t = 0 a permanent decrease in the rate of population 
growth is expected to occur three generations later. The most important effects 
of this shock are reproduced in Figs la ,  lb,  and l c 8  
As for this example z< 1 - i.,+ 6 holds, consumption for young and old 
individuals increases at t = 0 according to Proposition 1. However, in the 
long-run individual consumption will be below the previous steady-state value 
(see Figure la). The figures nicely bring out what the reasons are for the 
divergence of short-run and long-run effects. Without government intervention, 
at the time of the shock a large capital abundance would appear which, in this 
closed economy, would strongly decrease the interest rate. Consequently, 
old-age consumption of the generation born at t = 2 would decrease and 
consumption possibilities for later generations would increase. The timepath of 
lifetime utility that would result in this case without PAYG can be found in 
Figure lc. This timepath is not optimal according to the Benthamite SWF, 
however. As can be seen from eq. (6), the optimal intertemporal allocation of 
consumption depends on the difference between the interest rate and the social 
-0.06- 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
time 
- cons. young - capital stock 
FIG.la. The effect of an expected permanent decrease in 11 on consumption and capital 
'We used the specification of the model described in rootnote 7, except for the social discount 
rate hhere we use a loher value ( p  = 2.25) such that there is no PAYG-scheme (i.e., T = 0) in the 
initial steady state. The impulse is a decrease in population growth of 0.5x, ( n  = 0.16) from t = 3 
on. Except Tor T ,  the figure presents changes in the variables relative to their steady state values. 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
time 
-PAYG tax -saving 
FIG.I b. The effect of an expected permanent decrease in ti on savings and taxes 
-0.04- J 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
time 
- U with PAYG -- U without PAYG 
Fic;. Ic. The effect of a n  expected permanent decrease in 11 on utility 
discount rate. Therefore, as can be seen from Figure 1b, the social planner will 
partly prevent the capital abundance by decreasing savings through increasing 
the tax rate in all previous periods. As from t = 3, the tax rate increases strongly 
due to the dependency-ratio effect. As a result of this government intervention, 
generations born at the time of the shock and thereafter lose, while generations 
living before the shock gain (see Figure lc). So, the central planner, while 
smoothing the utility between both old and young generations living at the 
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same time, will not smooth utility between different time periods. O n  the 
contrary, compared with a world without social planner (i.e., T = O), the gains 
from aging for future generations are almost completely turned into losses. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper the effects of aging on optimal PAYG-financed public pension 
schemes and individual consumption have been analyzed in an  overlapping- 
generations general-equilibrium framework. The long-run effects of aging are 
well-known. This knowledge is summarized in Proposition 2 of this paper. This 
proposition says that in the long run the capital-thickening effect is dominated 
by the dependency-ratio effect, leading to lower consumption for both young 
and old individuals. The short-run effects of aging, however, are much less 
known in the literature. In particular, Cutler et a[. (1990) claim these effects to 
be ambiguous, but, at  the same time, suggest by numerical simulations that an  
unexpected decrease in the rate of population growth will have a negative effect 
on individual consumption, while if this decrease is expected to occur after a 
few decades, initial gains in consumption will be obtained. 
This paper has derived the initial effects of aging analytically. The results are 
reflected in Proposition 1 .  This proposition claims that for unexpected as well 
for expected aging of the population the size of the PAYG-financed public 
pension scheme is the determining variable for the initial effects. In  particular, 
for an extensive public pension system both types of shocks may lead to  losses 
in individual consumption. O n  the other hand, if the PAYG-taxes are relatively 
small, gains in consumption made possible by the lower need for savings will 
not be dominated by the requirement for higher transfers to maintain the level 
of old-age consumption. If the young then experience a consumption gain, this 
will, in an overlapping-generations model, partly have to be transferred to the 
old through an increase in the tax rate. So, it follows that if a PAYG-scheme 
is non-existent, it can come about because of an  expected decrease in the rate 
of population growth. With an  eye turned to reality, this might suggest that 
the abundant growth in coverage and size of public pension schemes which was 
manifest in the Western world during the first two decades after World War 
I1 may, in face of the anticipation of the aging of the population, have increased 
social welfare. Recent measures taken in the Western world aimed at restricting 
the growth rate of the taxes could then be explained from the fact that 
demographic changes appear to be much more dramatic than expected. In 
particular, given the then existing extensive PAYG-scheme, the sharp decrease 
in birth rates that started in the seventies in the EC countries made a drop in 
benefit rates unavoidable. Obviously one should be cautious in deriving policy 
conclusions from the stylized model used in this paper. The two-OLG set-up, 
used here for analytical convenience, may overstate the life-cycle effect of 
savings. Moreover, the assumption that public pensions are financed by 
lump-sum taxes is not very realistic. A straightforward extension of the analysis 
would be to allow for taxes on wage income and endogenous labor supply. 
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Finally, more research is needed in order to  establish whether the assumption 
that the government acts as a central planner maximizing a Benthamite SWF 
is a reasonable approximation of actual public-pension policy. 
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APPENDIX 
Equation (9 )  is derived by taking a first-order Taylor expansion of eqs (3). (5), and (6) around the 





~ ' ( c '),f "(k) 
dk
2+ u"((,') fdry 
P; I + ,f'(k) 2;I (1;' 
Next, from definition (8) it follows that 
Fc, 
-
Sc:' +----- c; 
; i;' (1;' (I + I T ) ~  h,  
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Using eq. (1 8) in eqs (1 5)-(17) in order to replace (?c;- ,167)a n d  (?c:/c';') by (functions of) (i;c,/?y) 
we get eq. (9) where the matrices ,M and J are  defined by -
-1 
where "(k)k/,f '(k)) is the (positively defined) elasticity of the production function, 
vr a,.
6 = -~. - - .  ..- - > 0 and  C; = --
r V k ( l+ r ) ( l  + t ~ ) ( l- c;) x' + (1 + n) r r  
The parameter r"  stands for the absolute rate of risk aversion of a young individual which is defined 
as  - (~ r " (c" ) /~ r ' ( c~ ) ) .Analogously, r' indicates the risk aversion of a n  old individual. System (9) 
comprises one predetermined variable (k) and  one forward-looking variable (c). The  eigenvalues 
of the Jacobian matrix J are  
As easily can be checked, one of these eigenvalues lies inside while the other lies outside the unit 
circle. So the system is saddlepoint stable. 
